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action against the manufacturer if he is liable for breach of warranty
to his buyer." Since the warranties are intended to cover only
defective goods, recovery for breach of implied warranty should be
limited to the extent that the goods are defective and to any resulting harm. Recovery should not be predicated on an implied
warranty theory where the seller's negligent rendering of the services results in injury; this would properly be an action based on
negligence. 36
John Campbell PalmerIV

Stocks-Texas Gulf Sulphur:
Rule l0b-5 Insider Liability Expanded?
On November 8, 1963, the defendant corporation commenced
core drilling on a tract of Canadian land. When a chemical assay
revealed a remarkably high mineral content,' the president of the
corporation ordered the results of their initial drilling kept confidential, even as to other officers, directors and employees of the
corporation. During the following four months, certain officers
and individuals said to have received tips from these officers purchased corporation stocks or calls2 thereon. On the morning of
April 11, 1964, the president of the corporation read unauthorized
newspaper reports of the drilling which seemed to infer a rich
strike. At 3:00 p.m. on Sunday, April 12, the corporation issued
a press release which purported to give the drilling results as of
the release date. Designed to quell rumors of a major ore strike,
the release was published in newspapers the following day. Yet,
while the drilling continued, the corporation prepared for the ultimate
disclosure of the discovery. A corporation statement relative to
carefully performed services leaves an inexplicable chasm between these two
concepts.
3 Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc., 246 A.2d 11, 16 (N.J. Super. 1968);
Delta Tank Mfg. Co. v. Weatherhead Co., 150 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D.
Ohio 3 1957) (manufacturer called the "sole and only wrongdoer").
6 E.g., Aegis Productions, Inc. v. Arriflex Corp. of America, 25 App.
Div.2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (1966).
1 So remarkably high was the copper, zinc, and silver content, that none
of five Texas Gulf Sulphur experts had ever seen or heard of a comparable
initial exploratory drill hole in a base metal deposit. SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 "A 'call' is a negotiable option contract by which the bearer has the
right to buy from the writer of the contract a certain number of shares of
a particular stock at a fixed price on or before a certain agreed-upon date."
Id. at 841 n.3.
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the extent of the discovery was given to the Canadian news media
to be released over the airways at 11:00 p.m. on April 15; however,
the news media failed to release it until 9:40 a.m. on April 16.
At a press conference called by the corporation on April 16, an
official detailed statement was read to representatives of American
financial media from 10:00 a.m. to 10:15 a.m. Between the time
the first press release was issued on April 12 and the dissemination
of the corporation's official announcement on the morning of April
16, three defendants, A, B and C, engaged in market activity. A
purchased stock on April 15. B ordered shares on April 15 and
at 8:30 a.m. on April 16; both orders were executed on April 16
when the exchange opened. C left the corporation press conference,
called his broker son-in-law shortly before 10:20 a.m. on April
16 and ordered shares for family trust accounts of which C was
a trustee but not a beneficiary. The son-in-law executed this order,
and he and his customers purchased additional shares. In April
1965, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) commenced
its action against the corporation, corporate individuals and tippees3
involved in stock purchases between November 8, 1963, and April
16, 1964. The SEC alleged that the defendants made illegal use of
inside information' by dealing in the corporation securities before
the information had been disclosed to the investing public. Specifically charged were violations of the provisions of section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and its rule 10b-5.5 The
3
Tippees are outsiders who trade in securities on the basis of non-public
information which has been leaked to them by inside tippers.
4 "There are two broad categories of information about the securities
market. The first is, in essence, financial sophistication about the market
generally or about an industry or firm gleaned from information available
to all. This by definition is not inside information. The second category is
knowledge of specific events or the probability of future events gained as a
result of an individual's access to corporate information not available to the
general public. This is inside information." Jennings, Insider Trading In
Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under
Rule l0b-5, 62 Nw. U.L. Rv. 809, 810 (1968).
The statute reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange- . . . (b)
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol71/iss2/15

2

Atkinson and Steptoe: Stocks--Texas Gulf Sulphur: Rule 10b-5 Insider Liability Expanded

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

district court found that two of the defendants, A and B, were
guilty of illegal insider activity, but otherwise the Commission's
complaint was ordered dismissed. Appeals were taken by the SEC
and A and B. Held, affirmed with respect to A and B, but reversed
and remanded with respect to the corporation and remaining individual defendants. The information acquired by the corporation
from the first chemical assay made in November constituted "material"6 inside information and until such material information was
properly disclosed to the public, all insiders were prohibited from
dealing in the corporation's securities. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).'
Before the enactment of federal regulations in the field of securities trading, only a minority of American jurisdictions imposed an
affirmative fiduciary duty on corporate management to disclose
material information when dealing with a stockholder.' The majority
of jurisdictions took the view that the corporate official's only fiduciary duty was to the corporation and not to the individual.9 A
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
6 "The basic test of materiality is whether a reasonable man would attach
importance . . . in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question." List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 933 (1965). In the
majority opinion of Texas Gulf Sulphur, Judge Waterman concludes that
material facts include "not only information disclosing the earnings and distributions of a company, but also those facts which affect the probable future
of the company and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy,
sell, or hold the company's securities." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968). For a listing of cases by circuit supporting
the proposition that a corporate insider's nondisclosure is prohibited by
section 10(b) and rule lob-5 only if material information is withheld, see
Annot.,
7 22 A.L.R.3d 798 (1968).
Although the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision contains many issues worthy
of extensive treatment, this comment is limited to a discussion of the "insider"
issue, being specifically concerned with the inclusive aspects of the insider
doctrine. Because the courts are currently expanding insider liability under
rule lOb-5, emphasis is placed upon both the recent judicial extension of
insider
activity and the practical problems posed for business.
8
E.g., Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952); Oliver v. Oliver,
118 Ga. 162, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Hotchkiss v. Fisher, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d
531 9(1932); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904).
E.g., Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943),
affd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945); Gladstone v. Murray Co., 314
Mass. 584, 50 N.E.2d 958 (1943); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186
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variation of the majority view existed which required a duty to disclose information only when "special facts" existed.'" Therefore,
in many situations, an injured stockholder had to resort to the common law action of deceit in order to recover damages, or he had to
seek recission of the sale in equity."
The stock market crash in 1929 emphasized the need for stronger
legislation, "to curb the abuses in securities trading."'" This expansive federal legislation was passed in 1933" and 1934.'" In implementing this legislation the federal government relied primarily
on section 17(a) of the 1933 act and section 15(c) (1) of the 1934
act. Loopholes existed, however, since 17(a) was applicable only
to prevent fraud arising out of the "offer or sale of securities,"' 5 and
rule 15(c)(1)-2 promulgated under section 15(c)(1), dealt
with the control of the purchase and sale of securities, but was limited to over-the-counter transactions by brokers and dealers. No
statute encompassed fraud in the purchase of securities by individuals, other than brokers and dealers in over-the-counter transactions.' 6 As a result, in 1942 the SEC enacted rule l0b-5,'" a
broad provision designed to strengthen the weaknesses of the earlier
Commission acts.' 8
At common law, insiders generally included corporate officers,
directors, and controlling shareholders,'" but rule lob-5 when read
N.E. 659 (1933); Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn. 210, 177 S.W. 479
(1915);
Annot., 84 A.L.R.615 (1933).
10 E.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Taylor v. Wright, 69
Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945); Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill.
App.
153, 63 N.E.2d 630 (1945); Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N.W.
955 (1925). See generally H. HENN, Cou'onTroNs, 378 (1961).
" The difficulties in maintaining these actions are discussed in Note,
The Prospects For Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy For Defrauded
Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1123 (1950).
12Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur And The Duty Of Disclosure, Another
View, 55 Go.L.J 664, 669 n.28 (1967), citing 78 CoNG. REc. 7862 (1934)
(remarks of Rep. Lea).
1"Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1964).
14 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1964).
1- Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1964). See
generally M11L. Loss, SEcuRrrfrs REGuLAnoN, 1442-1444 (2d. ed. 1961).
16 Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.: The Inside and Outside of Rule
10b-5, 46 B.U.L. Rlv. 205, 208 (1966).
"7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
'8 Rule lob-5 was intended to close the "loophole in the protections
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or
companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase."
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942. Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). For a discussion of the broad
language of Rule lOb-5, see Note, The Prospects For Rule X-lOB-5: An
Emerging Remedy For Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1123 (1950).
' See, James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n. v. Gulf, M. and 0.
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literally covers "any person."" In a continuing effort to protect
the investing public, the SEC has sought, and the courts have granted, an expansive application of rule lOb-5. A case of importance
in this expansion is In re Cady, Roberts and Co.,' where it was
made evident that the duty of disclosure is imposed upon persons
other than traditional insiders. 2 Cady, Roberts was a broker-dealer
case holding that rule lOb-5 standards of conduct imposed on a
registered broker-dealer do not permit him to "jump the gun" for
the benefit of himself, his partner or discretionary accounts. 3 Cady,
Roberts sounded the warning in clear terms to the business world:

any person in a special relationship with a company and privy to
its internal affairs is under a firm correlative duty not to exploit the
uninformed investor.24
The action against Texas Gulf Sulphur presented the SEC with
an opportunity to test its Cady, Roberts doctrine in the courts.2
It was apparent that the SEC was also attempting to extend the
scope of insiders to include lower echelon corporate employees
and family members. The district court, however, based the Texas
Gulf Sulphur decision on the materiality of the information and did

not consider whether or not all of the defendants were insiders
within the contemplation of rule lOb-5. The court of appeals, in
reversing the lower court's decision on materiality, held that lower
echelon employees" were insiders and had violated section 10(b)
R.R., 264 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959);
Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
952 (1955); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947);
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); 44 ILL. L. REv. 841 (1950).
0o17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
21

40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).

As to whether an individual is considered an insider for disclosure
purposes, the Cady, Roberts court stated:
The obligation rests on two principal elements; first the existence
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." Id. at 912 (citations
omitted).
2 3
Whitney, Section lOb-5:[sic] From Cady, Roberts To Texas Gull. Matters Of Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAw. 193, 199 (1965). In Cady, Roberts a
brokerage firm had a representative who was also on the board of directors
of a corporation. Upon learning that the corporation's dividend was to be
reduced, the director informed the brokerage firm of this fact before a public
announcement was made. On the basis of this information, the firm sold the
corporation
stock of its customers.
24
1n re Cady, Roberts and Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
Is In response to the concerns and anxieties of businessmen caused by
the SEC charges against Texas Gulf Sulphur, the New York Stock Exchange
22
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and rule 10b-5. While the language of the appellate court in Texas
Gulf Sulphur is broad enough to include family members as insiders,27 the court instead treated them as agents of their defendant
husbands. 8 This language could include "tippees" as well. The
SEC, however, was content to impose liability on the tipper alone.
It has been suggested that this approach was taken for the purpose
of discouraging tipping. 9 Another theory is that the SEC, in its
refusal to prosecute the tippees, read "any person" in a restrictive
manner which excludes tippees.

°

Even SEC lawyers have expressed

doubt that liability can be imposed on tippees.' However, one recent
case, Ross v. Licht,32 treated tippees as being subject to the same
published in December of 1966 a pamphlet proposing guidelines as to when
corporate officials could buy and sell securities without incurring rule 10b-5
liability. Note, Insider Liabilities Examined, 18 SYR. L. Rav. 808, 818
(1967), citing N.Y. Stock Exch., The Corporate Director and The Investing
Public, (1965), 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. RElP. ff 26,100 (1966). The same concern and anxiety exist today, as is evidenced by the fact that one thousand
businessmen recently paid $100 apiece to attend an informative discussion of
the Texas Gulf Sulphur case and its ramifications. Robards, To Disclose or
Not: The Law Seeks An Answer, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1968, § 6 (Business
and Finance), p. 1. Furthermore, directors' liability insurance rates have
increased by as much as 400% since July, 1968. TIME, Oct. 18, 1968, at 100.
26 Here the employees included the corporation's chief geologist, a field
geologist, and a geophysicist. Concerning acquisition of the information,
"it would seem that the information need only be obtained 'in the course' of
the insider's employment. Accordingly, the employment rationale would include a secretary who learns of material information while taking dictation
or a janitor who finds it in a wastepaper basket." Jennings, Insider Trading
In Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations
Under Rule lob-5, 62 Nw. U.L. Rv. 809, 827 n.82 (1968).
27 "[Alnyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or if he is disabled from disclosing it in
order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while
such inside information remains undisclosed." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401
28 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
Although there has been no judicial extension of the "any person"
blanket to members of the insider's family, it has been urged that failure
to impose restrictions upon families would deprive rule lob-5 of its strength.
Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.: The Inside and Outside of Rule 10b-5,
46 B.U.L. RPv. 205, 213 (1966), citing III L. Loss, SEcuRnaTEs R -GULATION,
1450, (2d. ed. 1961). In the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, the issue of whether to
extend rule lob-5 to families or not is clearly presented; however, the court
avoids the issue, treating the wives' purchases as made in the names of their
husbands.
29
Jennings, Insider Trading In Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under Rule lob-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 809,

829 (1968).

"oNote, Texas Gulf Sulphur And The Duty of Disclosure, Another View,
55 GEO. L.. 664, 689 (1967), citing Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del.
Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949). But see Fleischer, Securities Trading and
Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Proceeding,51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1283 (1965).
1 NaSWsEE, Aug. 26, 1968, at 66.
32263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In the Ross case, three dentists,
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duty of disclosure as are corporate insiders. The holding in Ross,

taken in conjunction with the Cady, Roberts doctrine, " the broad

holding in Texas Gulf Sulphur,34 and its accompanying dicta, 5 indicate that the outside boundaries of rule lOb-5 might also encompass
tippees. Such a future result would be consistent with the court's current expansion of the definition of insiders.
Corporate executives are concerned not only with intracorporate
problems as presented by Texas Gulf Sulphur, but also with the
intercorporate problems raised by subsequent SEC actions. In
August 1968, Glen Alden Corp. agreed to forgo the widespread
practice of inviting single, large investors to briefing sessions on
prospects and profits." On August 26, 1968, the SEC instituted
an administrative proceeding against Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
and Smith, Inc. The nation's largest brokerage firm was charged
with giving inside information to investment companies while withholding such information from other clients. Also charged were the
tippees, some fourteen investment companies."' These latest SEC
actions seem to be an expansion of rule lOb-5 to include a corporation's or individual's business associates as insiders. 8
who had no corporate connections but rather were friends of directors, were
held liable for nondisclosure in securities transactions. The court stated that
the three probably could be termed insiders; if not, they definitely were tippees and in any event would be liable for aiding and abetting a rule lob-5
violation. For liability to exist on the part of tippees, it must be proven that
the tippee was aware that his tip had been wrongfully revealed by an insider.
The tippee must be a knowing confederate. Accord, In re Calton Crescent,
173 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1949), aftd sub nom., Manufacturers Trust Co. v.

Becker, 338 U.S. 304 )1949).

See text at note 22 supra.
a See text at note 26 supra.
35
As Darke's tippees are not defendants in this action, we need not
decide whether, if they acted with actual or constructive knowledge that
the material information was undisclosed, their conduct is as equally
violative of the Rule as the conduct of their insider source, thoug we
note that it certainly could be equally reprehensible. SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968).
36 The SEC alleged that Glen Alden Corporation had given important
information to several mutual funds while withholding it from the public.
Although Glen Alden admitted nothing, a permanent injunction was accepted.
NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 9, 1968, at 75.
37
In June 1966, Merrill, Lynch, as manager of an underwriting syndicate,
allegedly discovered that Douglas Aircraft was entering into a period of
financial difficulty. This information was passed on to fourteen large, favored
investing institutions, but was withheld from the public and the rest of
Merrill, Lynch's customers. As a result, the large institutions were able to
sell most of their Douglas stock. Id. at 75.
38 For a discussion of the business associate's duty, see m L. Loss,
SEcuarrjis RGur.AToN, 1451, (2d. ed. 1961) and Note, The Prospects For
Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy For Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE
LJ. 1120,1144 (1950).
33
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In order to insure the existence of a fair securities market, the
SEC now appears to be seeking authority to apply rule 10b-5 insider
liability to prohibit the use of inside information by investors of any
status. As a result, the determination of which individuals fall within the class of insiders should create very few problems. Instead,
problems arise because the instances when disclosure is required
have been multiplied, thus subjecting a larger group to the array of
other problems left in the wake of the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision. 9
Within the economy's complex interdependent network, it is not
uncommon to find individual businessmen serving both as corporate
officers and as investment representatives. Under recent SEC proceedings, conflicts of interest and other problems arise. Executives
or persons with access to inside information may have to forgo
trading-whether it leads to loss or gain. Increased liability upon
executives may lead to less efficient corporate management.4"
Should corporations disclose everything or institute a complete
blackout on information? How long should insiders allow the public
to absorb disclosed information before dealing in the corporation's
securities?4" Will limitations be placed on private suits against
insiders? 2
At the present time there are no absolute solutions to these
problems, and it is quite likely that the final word will come from
the United States Supreme Court. As an alternative, the SEC or
Congress4 may decide that the "cure is worse than the disease" and
promulgate definite guidelines. For the present, however, the busi39 Questions about the effects of the Texas Gull Sulphur case abound.
Executives and lawyers bemoan the "loose" language of the decision. What
is "material" information? What is the proper method of disclosure of inside
information? Just when must full public disclosure be made? How long
after disclosure must an insider wait before trading in the corporation's
securities? These problems affect all insiders, whether they be of the
traditional
corporate breed or of the recently spawned "any person" class.
40
The appellate court was unimpressed with this argument. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968).
41 The SEC is considering barring all corporate insiders from trading in
the corporation's securities within twenty-four hours of any official announcement.42 U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Sept. 9, 1968, at 104.
1n 1966 there were forty-nine private actions stemming from the
Texas Gulf Sulphur decision. These plaintiffs sought $2,800,000 in compensatory damages and over $77,000,000 in punitive damages. SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 267 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
43 For a study of recommended legislation in Canada and Great Britain,
see Whitney, Section 10b-5: [sic] From Cady, Roberts To Texas Gulf: Matters
of Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAw. 193, 205 (1965).
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ness world must adapt to the Texas Gulf Sulphur restrictions and requirements.
Stephen Lewis Atkinson
Robert Mason Steptoe, Jr.

Torts---Landowner's Standard of Care Based on
Ordinary Principles of Negligence
Plaintiff, a social guest of defendant, suffered injury when a
cracked porcelain handle of a bathroom water faucet broke in his
hand. Defendant had been aware of the defective condition of the
handle for several weeks but failed to warn the plaintiff. There
was no showing that the faucet handle crack was obvious. Defendant's motion for a summary judgment was sustained, and plaintiff
appealed. Held, reversed. The proper test of liability to be applied
to the possessor of land is whether, in the management of his property, he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability
of injuries to others. The plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee,
or invitee is not determinative of the occupier's liability. The two
dissenting justices contended that liability based on the historical
visitor distinctions provided stability and predictability to this area
of the law, and supplied a workable approach to the problems involved. Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561
(1968).
This case is significant since it abolishes in California the old
tests for standard of care owed to a trespasser, a licensee, and an
invitee, and establishes a single new test based on ordinary principles
of negligence. Analysis of the decision requires consideration of
three aspects of the problem raised by it: the history of the visitor
distinctions, the value of the visitor distinctions today and the
validity of the new California test.
I.

HISTORY OF THE VISITOR DISTINCTIONS

The privileged position of the landowner' was taken for granted

when the distinctions in the liability of the occupier were developed
in the middle of the nineteenth century. Several factors account for
this treatment. At that time the principle that a man should be
I The term "landowner" is used interchangeably in this comment with
"occupier," "occupant," and "possessor." These terms all refer to that person
who is in possession and control of the premises.
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